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Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government? 1 Introduction
Recently, research into the economic effects of constitutions has increased notably, with form of government being particularly thoroughly analyzed. A number of authors attribute wide-ranging effects to form of government. Persson and Tabellini (2003) , for example, derive the following results (see also Blume et al. 2009 ): (1) government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential compared with parliamentary systems; (2) the size of the welfare state is about 2-3% lower in presidential systems; (3) presidential systems seem to have lower levels of corruption; and (4) presidential systems appear to be a hindrance to increased productivity, but this result is not highly significant.
If constitutions have such far-reaching effects, it is important to better understand how they evolve over time and what factors influence these changes. Although this process is one of the core issues in constitutional economics, few papers have actually studied constitutional change. This paper undertakes to identify the determinants of change in the form of government. We choose form of government as our explanandum because, in terms of economic effects, the distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems is one of the most analyzed and-apparently-one of the most significant in constitutional political economy.
It is often assumed that constitutions in general and form of government in particular are changed only very infrequently. Not true. Elkins et al. (2009) The upper panel of Figure 1 suggests that changes in form of government take place throughout the sample period. The highest peak is seen during the early 1990s and the lowest peak in the mid 1970s. In the lower panel, the changes are differentiated with regard to direction of change. There are 68 changes from presidential to parliamentary forms of government und 55 changes in the opposite direction. The peak in constitutional activity identified in the early 1990s is mainly due to countries switching from presidential to parliamentary forms of government. 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 All Changes (123 cases 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 Presidential to Parliamentary (68 cases) Parliamentary to Presidential (55 cases)
To emphasize the dynamics of institutional choice, we do not analyze first-time constitutional choices, but instead focus on changes in form of government that occur later in a country's history. Robinson and Torvik (2008) note that most African countries established a parliamentary form of government in their early post-colonial period but that many of them have now switched to the presidential form of government. We therefore ask: Given that a country "originally" chose a parliamentary system, under what conditions is it likely that form still prevails today? In addition, which factors will affect the probability of switching to a presidential form of government?
We study two questions empirically, namely: (1) When is a switch likely to occur? and, given that a switch has occurred, (2) Why did it occur? The first question is answered by analyzing timeinvariant factors in the framework of a proportional hazard model; the second question is investigated by considering time-variant factors in the context of panel data logit models.
Our main results, for a sample of 169 countries, show that a switch is more likely to occur if the "initial constitution" is parliamentary rather than presidential, if the country was never a British or French colony, and if the country is located in either the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, or South Asia. In a much smaller sample, we test the influence of additional variables and find that those countries that have reformed their constitution once are less likely to alter it again. Societies characterized by a high degree of ethnic and religious fractionalization are more likely, and societies with a high degree of ethnic polarization are less likely to change their form of government. Countries with a high proportion of Muslims are more likely to amend their constitutions. Former colonial powers are less likely to change their constitutions. Finally, we find evidence that countries characterized by a high share of primary exports in GNP are less likely to adjust the form of government, which can be interpreted as evidence of the "resource curse."
The main factors influencing the likelihood of a change in form of government are political. Systems of sectarian political participation, where incompatible interests lead to intense factionalism and government favoritism, show a greater probability of constitutional reform. Internal government crises and limited armed conflict make changes more likely. A high degree of democratization in societies will foster change, whereas strong democratic competition and participation tends to prevent alterations in the form of government. If the relative number of students and literates in a country rises, it becomes less likely that the society will initiate constitutional reform.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses two competing viewpoints regarding the form of government and provides an overview of the very scant literature on endogenous constitutional choice. Section 3 develops a number of hypotheses as to the factors that determine a switch from parliamentary to presidential systems, or vice versa. Section 4 sets out our em-pirical approach and a description of the data. Section 5 addresses the question of when the form of government is likely to change and Section 6 the question of which factors help explain the occurrence of constitutional reform. Section 7 concludes.
Changing the Form of Government-Competing Views
We now provide a survey of the relevant literature. If we confined ourselves to studies analyzing the determinants of change in form of government, the section would be extremely short, possibly nonexistent, as we could find virtually nothing on the topic. There is a little work on the endogenization of constitutional choice in general. However, in this section we also discuss two competing viewpoints as to the relevance of different forms of government (parliamentarian and presidential).
As these viewpoints are radically different regarding possible determinants of constitutional change, we begin by presenting both, illustrating each with examples from Africa.
Most of the relevant political economy analyses are based on the premise that the choice of form of government invariably means more or less separation of powers: in parliamentary systems, the (head of the) executive depends for survival on retaining the confidence of the majority of the legislature. In presidential systems, the president can survive in office even without the confidence of the legislature. Presidential systems thus have an additional veto player or a higher degree of separation of powers, which has far-reaching effects, as Persson et al. (1997) of separation of powers suggests that societies that want to protect themselves from the perils of government prefer a presidential form of government, whereas societies that believe in the welfareenhancing power of the state prefer parliamentary systems. Thinking about it in terms of consensual versus majoritarian terms implies that those societies that are willing to allocate vast powers to a single person-and accept that a sizeable segment of society will be dominated by another seg-ment that is not much larger than the dominated one-prefer presidential systems, whereas societies that care about deliberation and consensus would opt in favor of parliamentary systems. Robinson and Torvik (2008) point out that Persson et al. (1997) were greatly influenced by the system in place in the United States but that presidential systems in Latin American and Africa are different from the U.S. experience in a number of ways. For example, presidents in other countries often have more formal powers (e.g., budget initiative). Additionally, they often even enjoy legislative powers such as the power to decree new legislation without approval from other legislative bodies. Regarding the African experience with presidential systems, Prempeh (2008, 110) cites the "imperial presidency" and gives numerous examples of the wide-ranging power of African presidents ("government by press release," i.e., without having consulted parliament; presidents often control slush funds that are not subject to legislative oversight; legislation often gives explicit leeway to the president ["as he thinks fit," "as he may prescribe"]; in some countries, the president even chooses the speaker of parliament and has vast appointment powers as to nearly all nonlegislative constitutional and statutory offices).
How do presidents obtain legislative approval of their policies? One way is to offer lucrative jobs and/or buy the support of legislators. Prempeh (2008, 116) gives an example from Zambia in which President Chiluba appointed nearly half the total number of legislators to ministerial positions within his administration. Further, presidents' parties sometimes actually have the power to expel legislators from parliament if they oppose the president. This occurred, for example, in Zambia in 2001 when the ruling party expelled 22 of its legislators for their opposition to President Chiluba's attempt to secure a third term of office. Sometimes, the constitution even explicitly allows for expulsion of parliamentarians who have voted as they saw fit. Article 77(l) of the Sierra Leone Constitution, for example, states that a "legislator must vacate his seat 'if by his conduct in Parliament by sitting and voting with members of a different party, the Speaker is satisfied after consultation with the Leader of that Member's party that the Member is no longer a member of the political party under whose symbol he was elected to Parliament'" (Prempeh, 2008, 118) . Prempeh (ibid., 117) argues that the lack of internal democracy in Africa's parties facilitates presidential dominance: "In the case of majority parties, this hierarchical and oligarchic control is usually exercised for the president's benefit, if not at his behest." Courts are said to follow a "jurisprudence of executive supremacy" (ibid., 118).
In summary, it appears questionable whether presidential systems should be systematically categorized as entailing a higher degree of separation of powers than parliamentary ones. Thus, in a country in which a limited number of elite groups decide upon the constitution, those who see themselves as future presidents (and their followers) might well lobby in favor of a presidential form of government. In other words, if the presidential form of government entails more concentrated power, then potential holders of that power might favor establishing such a form of government. Aghion et al. (2004) deal explicitly with the choice between presidential or parliamentary forms of government. Although not framed in terms of the consensual-majoritarian distinction introduced by Lijphart (1992) , their approach seems compatible with it. Aghion et al. ask how much "unchecked power" a society should optimally delegate to its leaders, then proceed to ask under what conditions societies can be expected to choose that optimal degree of delegation, and, finally, turn to some cross-country analysis. They equate "insulation" with unchecked power. As between autocracy and democracy, autocrats are more insulated than democratically elected governments. Within democracy, presidential systems have a higher degree of insulation than parliamentary ones. What is the central driving force behind the variation in insulation as defined here? Aghion et al. (ibid.) find that insulation is positively and significantly correlated with both ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, meaning that highly fragmented societies are less democratic. However, if they are democratic, these fragmented societies can be expected to have a presidential rather than a parliamentary form of government. Robinson and Torvik (2008) explicitly endogenize presidentialism. Based on a model with two groups (each consisting of citizens, politicians, and political leaders), they show that presidentialism is more attractive when the two groups' preferences with regard to public goods are more polarized, when ideological differences are more extreme, and when the government budget is small, which Robinson and Torvik equate with poor societies.
Finally, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) deal with the endogenization of major constitutional rules, reflecting Lijphart's approach by distinguishing between majoritarian and consensual systems. They hypothesize that this choice is driven by the ex ante degree of income inequality: if it is relatively high, a majoritarian constitution is more likely, if it is relatively low, a consensual constitution is more likely. For our purposes, this means that the probability of a switch is high when either the "original" constitution, for whatever reason, made the "wrong" choice as to form of government or if the distribution of resources in the society has changed over time.
Explaining Change in the Form of Government-An Exploratory Exposition
Our brief survey of the literature shows that theoretical arguments purporting to explain switches in form of government are, to say the least, underdeveloped. In this section, we therefore explore a rather large number of potential drivers of such a switch.
Explaining switches in form of government implies identifying reasons why the former status quo was changed. Our assumption is that change will take place only if the extant form of government does not adequately match the circumstances of its society. An "adequate" form of government is, thus, equivalent to a stable equilibrium. Note that this does not imply any normative evaluation regarding its welfare properties: an "adequate" form of government is simply one that does not induce further change. Indeed, in the matter of economic development, there very well might be "bad" as well as "good" equilibria. Framed like this, we are interested in identifying those variables that affect the adequacy of the form of government given the characteristics of a country.
The economic approach analyzes utility-maximizing choices under the assumption of given preferences. Hence, changes in behavior are attributed to changes in the relevant restrictions. Here, our interest is in collective choices and the analysis is complicated by the fact that we need some way of aggregating individual preferences into collective choices. Outcomes regarding constitutional choices, therefore, are a result of an interplay between three groups of factors: preferences, procedures used to aggregate them, and relevant restrictions.
We first assume preferences and procedures to be given. We further propose to separate internal (domestic) and external (foreign) restrictions. For instance, in many countries, important foreign restrictions find their origin in former colonial powers, which exerted a strong influence on the choice of form government in their former colonies. If the colonial power's influence was not conducive to achieving an adequate fit of form of government in the sense just described, we would expect to observe more frequent change in former colonies than in noncolonies. Since the influence exerted by various former colonial powers might well be different, we need to also differentiate the various colonial powers (e.g., English or French). 1
In a second step, we explicitly take preferences into account. Constitutional change is still possible even if we assume individual preferences to be stable due to the collective nature of constitutional choice: constitutions can be changed only as a consequence of explicit collective action. However, a demand for constitutional change always needs to be articulated and initiated by individuals, and these persons will be successful in their quest only if they can achieve a sufficient following, which could be either a majority of the country's citizens or, in an extreme case, a handful of determined soldiers.
Institutions have distributive consequences. We propose to think of an initiator's demand for constitutional change as an indirect demand for distributional gain. Chances of successfully implementing constitutional change are determined by the demander's bargaining power vis-à-vis the rest of society. The bargaining power of a group is determined by its ability and willingness to inflict costs on others and thereby reduce total social surplus. The more such power an individual or a 1
We treat the following countries as colonial powers: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
group of individuals has, the more influence the individual or group is likely to have on the contents of the constitution. Or, put differently, if the number and composition of groups that have managed to solve the problem of collective action (Olson 1965) , changes and/or their relative bargaining power increases, constitutional change becomes a possibility. In the framework developed above, an inadequate choice of form of government is one that does not properly reflect the relative power of those organizations desiring a more self favoring distribution of cooperation rents. 2
To determine the adequacy of the form of government, the original choice is obviously crucial. We therefore propose to divide our exploratory analysis of potential factors determining the change in form of government into three phases. First, we briefly deal with the adequacy of the original choice. We then analyze the potential relevance of time-invariant factors. In the third phase, we develop a number of hypotheses based on time-variant factors.
The "Original" Choice
Change in form of government means deviation from some former "original" choice. Over the last half-century, many countries became independent for the first time and have thus made their original choice. In determining the factors causing change, the original choice is thus crucial. Lijphart (1992) classifies parliamentary systems as consensual, that is, they are based on the norm that most members of a society should consent to the most important decisions regarding the provision of public goods. However, if this norm is not shared by the elites, a parliamentary form of government might be an inadequate choice. If, further, large segments of society have not managed to solve the problem of collective action and have themselves not (yet) organized in groups, there is no reliable means of guaranteeing that most people will have the opportunity or even the desire to participate in major decisions and so a parliamentary form of government might, again, be inadequate. If, on the other hand, there is a very small number of well-organized groups (in the extreme case, only one), then the presidential form of government might be an adequate fit. 3 2
The last couple of decades have witnessed a still unresolved debate regarding the causes of economic development. Lipset (1959) argues that economic development needs to precede the emergence of (democratic) political institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2007) purport to show that this is not true. Acemoglu and his various co-authors (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006 ) emphasize the distinction between political institutions, political power, and economic institutions. This strikes us as not very convincing since any kind of institution is political in the sense that it is the result of some sort of collective decision making. North et al. (2009) point out that the social sciences have not come to grips with the interactions of economic and political development. 3 A recent paper by Guerriero (2009) analyzes the adequate choice of the general system of legislation and adjudication, i.e., the choice between statute law and common law, the first being more centralized than the letter.
Guerriero is only interested in those countries in which a legal system has been transplanted. He finds that a switch is more likely the higher the heterogeneity between transplanter and transplanted, and the weaker the in-
Conjectures Based on Time-Invariant Factors
Our exploratory analysis of factors potentially causing constitutional change first deals with timeinvariant restrictions and then moves toward preferences. Procedures are mentioned only in closing.
In the absence of a theory as to the relative importance of the various factors, we present them in the order of exogeneity, i.e., we begin with geographical factors and then move on to institutional ones.
Latitude and continent can be interpreted as proxies for underlying causes rather than as causes in and of themselves and thus may serve as control variables for other explanatory variables. However, geographic location contains information on the climate, soil, probability of natural disasters, adequacy of crops, disease environment, and so forth. It is argued ) that the disease environment is an excellent predictor of institutional quality in general. can also be interpreted as implying that favorable disease environments are not only conducive to longer time horizons but also to more consensual decision making. If this is indeed the case, societies characterized by favorable disease environments are more likely to opt for parliamentary systems. 4
Access to the sea is another important aspect of geography. It is claimed (e.g., Gallup et al. 1999) that such access can have important consequences for a country's development. Whereas the export and import of goods primarily affects a country's economic development, the import and exchange of ideas might affect its institutional development.
Another important facet of geography is a country's natural resource endowment. The so-called resource curse has been identified as an important factor preventing development (e.g., Mehlum et al. 2006, Andersen and Aslaksen 2008) . Autocrats can cling to power by bribing any malcontents with, or the proceeds from selling, resources. In resource-rich countries, control of the state is very attractive and fierce competition for same is to be expected. If each competing group is (over-)confident that its representative could be president, they might agree on the presidential form of government. Alternatively, one can imagine a resource-rich country with a small and homogenous stitutions in the transplanted country. Drawing a not unreasonable analogy between his work and ours, in our case the transplanters are the former colonies and presidential systems are the equivalent of more centralized government. 4
We do not include settler mortality in the models presented below, as the drop in sample size would be prohibitively high. However, preliminary analysis suggests that this specific variable contains little predictive power for our question of interest.
elite that manages to maintain a cartel. Survival rates of parliamentary constitutions are expected to be low in resource-rich countries. 5
Time-invariant institutional restrictions are the consequence of former choices made so long ago that they can be considered exogenous for the period analyzed. Bockstette et al. (2002) show that state antiquity is significantly correlated with political stability and institutional quality, among other variables. We conjecture that state antiquity also determines the survival probability of the form of government. Bockstette et al. argue that long-established states are likely to have better public administration. We extend and generalize this idea, arguing that long-established statehood is likely to be connected with a number of firmly established institutions and organizations. The more numerous these are, the more costly and, consequently, less likely constitutional change. In the spirit of Olson (1982) , one could argue that a fairly long period of state stability will enable a large number of latent interest groups to become organized and start making demands to be heard in collective decision-making. This would imply that older states are more liable to have a parliamentary form of government-and be able to sustain it over time. 6
As discussed above, it is easy to imagine an inadequate choice as to form of government being made if a foreign actor had an important influence on that choice. States that were never colonies face fewer external restrictions, can make a more adequate constitutional choice, and thus are less likely to switch their form of government than are former colonies. The various colonial powers' different approaches to the independence process leads directly to our second-and more specific-hypothesis regarding former colonial powers: the survival of the original constitution is a function of the identity of the former colonizers.
Different colonizers arrived with different concepts about and styles of legislation and adjudication.
On the most general level, these different families have been grouped into common law and civil law. Among civil law regimes are the French, Scandinavian, German, and certain socialist systems (see, e.g., Zweigert and Kötz 1998) . Ex ante it is unclear whether there is any relationship between adequacy of chosen form of government and the country's historic legal family. Countries belonging to the same legal family have different forms of government and have been able to sustain them. 5 Implicitly, this argument assumes that the value of the resources is well known at the time of constitution making, which may not be the case. Suppose a constitution is established long before valuable resources are discovered and the society manages to actually implement its consensual constitution over decades. Under such a scenario, it is thus not the existence of valuable resources as such that could influence constitutional choice but the exact timing of their discovery. 6 Bockstette et al. (2002) also mention that nationhood would foster linguistic unity, which might, in turn, lead to a sense of common identity. In our sample, we find that older nations have less linguistic fractionalization, which would support that hypothesis (correlation coefficient = -0.27). Of course, this correlation does not say anything about the causality relationship.
For example, both the United States and the United Kingdom belong to the common law family, but the former has the paradigmatic presidential system, whereas the latter has the classic parliamentary system. Although there is a high correlation between former colonizers and legal families, the correlation is not perfect. This situation allows us to discover whether the former or the latter (i.e., colonizer or legal family) is more relevant in explaining the likelihood of constitutional change.
We now develop two conjectures that focus on preferences rather than restrictions for determining the adequacy of the form of government. Buchanan and Tullock (1962, Ch. 5) introduce the notion of external costs to the economic analysis of constitutions. These are costs "that the individual expects to endure as a result of the actions of others over which he has no direct control" (ibid., 45).
Buchanan and Tullock argue that rational individuals will take external costs into consideration when choosing constitutional rules. The more heterogenous the preferences across society, the higher the expected external costs that can be inflicted upon any individual. Assuming that they are uncertain about their position in society, rational individuals would strive to establish consensual constitutions because expected external costs are lower with this type of constitution than under majoritarian ones. Hence, the more heterogenous a society is in terms of preferences, the more adequate is the parliamentary form of government. If a heterogenous society did not "originally" choose a parliamentary system, we expect to observe a switch. 7
A specific aspect of preferences is the propensity to accept hierarchies. According to Aghion et al. (2004) , presidential systems possess more unchecked power than do parliamentary ones. Thus, we conjecture that a high propensity to accept hierarchies fits relatively better to presidential systems, a low propensity to parliamentary ones.
The last two conjectures focused on individual preferences, implicitly assuming that citizen preferences are relevant in constitutional choice. Whether this is actually the case, however, depends on the methods employed to choose a constitution. There is a very small body of literature analyzing the first-time choice of constitutions, in which such procedures as focused on as explanatory variables (Carey 2009; Voigt 2003; Widner 2007) . Arguably, such an approach has not been particularly successful and therefore we do not put much emphasis on procedures in this paper.
Conjectures Based on Time-Variant Factors
In the introductory paragraphs of this section, one mechanism resulting in constitutional change was already briefly mentioned-changes in the bargaining power of groups could induce demand for such change. Here, a number of hypotheses are developed on the basis of that conjecture. Note that the "adequacy" of constitutional choices acquires a slightly different meaning in the context of time-variant factors: when the number of strong collective actors grows over time, this could imply that a presidential system that used to be adequate is no longer so. We discuss four domestic, and one foreign, factors, namely: (1) the distribution of resources, (2) the capacity to act collectively, (3) the level of democracy, (4) economic performance, and (5) contagion.
One important determinant of economic power is the distribution of resources, which, in turn, should be decisive for the constitutional provisions chosen. A high concentration of economic power implies that a small elite is very influential in the constitutional development of a country. In line with Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) , we hypothesize that the likelihood of switching to the presidential form of government increases with the concentration of economic power.
Collective action is always necessary for constitutional change to occur, but many latent interest groups never manage to overcome the problem of collective action and thus never become actual interest groups (Olson 1965) . But those groups that do manage to overcome the problem will demand participation in important collective choices. A hypothesis along the lines of Lijphart (1992) would thus predict that the higher the number of organized interest groups, the more likely a society is to choose the parliamentary form of government.
This paper analyzes switches in the form of government independently of whether the country is run democratically or by autocrats. Yet, we conjecture that the degree of actually implemented democracy can be an important determinant of this kind of constitutional change. The more firmly established the possibilities of participating in important collective decisions, as well as of monitoring the governing, the higher the probability of observing such change.
Economic performance will affect the relative power of interest groups. In general, poor economic development will decrease government popularity and thus is expected to increase the likelihood of observing a higher demand for constitutional change.
The four time-variant factors just discussed focus on domestic influence. Implicitly, we have assumed that societies change their constitutions "in splendid isolation" (except for the degree of economic openness), but it is plausible that the likelihood of choosing a certain institutional arrangement might be influenced by how many other states have already chosen that specific institution. The closer these states are along various dimensions (e.g., geographically, ethnically, linguistic, etc), the higher might be the likelihood that one will do as it's neighbors have done (for diffusion models in general, see Elkins and Simmons 2005) . With regard to Africa, Nwabueze (1975, 68) observes: "At pan-African gatherings, leaders from Commonwealth African countries whose position was only that of Head of Government, must have experienced a certain sense of disappointment at being denied the honour and dignity accorded to their counterparts who were Heads of State in their own countries." Hence, we would expect a switch toward presidentialism to be more likely, the greater the number of a country's neighbors that are already presidential.
We have now presented a number of time-invariant and time-varying factors that are conjectured to have an impact on the choice of form of government as well as on its stability over time. In the next section, we describe our estimation approach and present our data in more detail.
Empirical Approach and Data

Empirical Approach
Our empirical analysis considers the period 1950-2003, which means that we concentrate on modern history. The choice of this time period is partly dictated by data availability and partly because many countries only came into being after World War II. First, we study when constitutions are likely to be amended. Employing a large sample of countries (169 countries), we estimate survival rates of forms of government using the Kaplan-Meier nonparametric method and then investigate the influence of time-invariant factors on these survival rates with the help of Cox proportional hazard models. To investigate the impact of more of the factors discussed above, we repeat the analysis with a much smaller sample (87 countries).
In the second part of the analysis, we study factors that may help explain why a switch from one form of government to another occurs. This issue is investigated in the framework of fixed-effects panel data logit models using a change in the form of government as the dependent variable. The unbalanced sample comprises 153 countries.
For both these empirical analyses, the modeling approach is general to specific (see Hendry 1993),
i.e., we start with a general model and eliminate insignificant variables in a consistent testing-down process to improve estimation efficiency.
Dependent Variable
We need a reliable indicator to determine both the survival probability of a given form of government and the factors causing its change. To make global inferences, this indicator ought to be available for as many countries as possible. The indicator should be available as a time series that goes back at least until the 1950s, the period when many African states began to become independent. The defining characteristic of parliamentary systems is that the head of government depends for survival in office on the continued confidence of a parliamentary majority. Our variable should thus be defined on the basis of this criterion. The indicator that best suits these criteria is provided by Banks (2004) and "refers to the degree to which a premier must depend on the support of a majority in the lower house of a legislature in order to remain in office." We define a presidential system as one where either the office of premier does not exist or if it does, it does not have any parliamentary responsibility. Parliamentary systems are defined as having a premier who is, at least to some extent, constitutionally responsible to the legislature. 8
Independent Variables
Many indicators for the potentially relevant explanatory variables developed in the previous section are straightforward and these will not be described here. Table A3 in the Appendix provides summary information about the contents and sources of the variables, and Tables A1 and A2 set forth descriptive statistics. Here, we discuss, in the same order as the hypotheses in Section 3, only those variables that warrant a little more detail.
Geographic location was the first potential time-invariant variable. Often, this variable is proxied for by using very coarse continent dummies. We prefer to classify our countries into one of 10 different regions, which is a more fine-grained approach and can distinguish, for example, between
Latin American and Caribbean countries. In addition, we control for a country's distance from the equator.
It was conjectured that the age of statehood could have an impact on the likelihood of a switch in form of government. The age of statehood is proxied by the variable "statehist 5" constructed by Bockstette et al. (2002) . They divide the period from 1 to 1950 CE into 39 half-centuries and ask for each of the resulting slices whether there was a government above the tribal level, whether that government was locally based or foreign, and how much of the current country's territory was ruled by that government. The variable used here is based on a discount rate of 5% on each additional half-century.
The heterogeneity of preferences can be proxied for by a number of variables. Over the last decade, ethnolinguistic fractionalization has been used frequently. Usually, three dimensions of fractionalization are distinguished-ethnic, religious, and linguistic. Alesina et al. (2003) put forward three 8 Drawing on Alvarez et al. (1996) , Golder (2005) has a variable "institution" that partially corresponds with form of government. However, he combines another aspect with it, namely, whether a country was democratic or a dictatorship in a given year. In other words, the de jure constitutional form is combined with the de facto degree of democracy. The Banks variable also takes the effective situation into account but has the advantage of presenting values even for those years in which the country was not democratic. The Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2000 ) contains a variable "system" that distinguishes between presidential and parliamentary systems. Unfortunately, its time series begins only in 1975.
fractionalization indices, which distinguish carefully between ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. Esteban and Rey (1994) argue that the concept of fractionalization might not adequately capture important cleavages. The authors speculate that this problem is most likely to be present if the society under study is divided into two groups of similar size, a situation they refer to as polarization. We include this alternative proxy for the heterogeneity of preferences.
The propensity to accept hierarchies is an individual trait and it is not easy to attribute such traits to entire societies. Yet, different religions have been evaluated as having different attitudes toward hierarchical structures. In his treatise on Italian regions, Putnam (1993) argues that the Catholic Church has a vertical organization structure. La Porta et al. (1997) generalize this result and classify Islam and the various Orthodox churches as having hierarchical structures. 9 We thus propose to use the most prevalent religion in a country religious affiliation as a proxy for the propensity to accept hierarchies.
The first of our time-variant factors is the distribution of resources. Vanhanen (1997) presents a number of proxy variables for the distribution of resources across a society. We draw on three of them here. "Share of family farms" counts the area of such farms as a percentage of total farmland.
Even though such an indicator may not be particularly relevant for industrial countries, it is a useful one for the distribution of resources in many less developed countries, which make up the largest part of our sample. The variable "knowledge distribution" reflects the extent to which knowledge resources are distributed among the members of society. It is the arithmetic mean of the percentage of students among the entire population and the percentage of a country's population that is literate.
The variable "urban population" gives the percentage share of urban dwellers to total population.
The second time-variant factor is the degree to which individuals have formed organizations and are thus able to act collectively. One way to proxy for this would be to count all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) active in a country but such an indicator is not available. What is available is an indicator counting the number of trade associations, listed in the World Guide to Trade Associations (Coates et al. 2007 ), which covers up to 140 countries over the period from 1973 to 2002. A second indicator counts the number of international NGOs (INGOs) present in a given country (Paxton 2002) . Both indicators are far from ideal as they rely on a subsample of all NGOs but are the best we could find. 10 The correlation coefficient between the two variables is positive and reasonably high (0.58), which suggests that they are measuring the same latent variable. Since Coates et al.'s (2007) indicator is available only from the mid 1970s onward, we use the number of INGOs in our analysis to preserve a longer time series. 9 We follow their classification here although it is debatable whether Islam should be classified as hierarchic. 10
In addition, an ideal measure would take not only the number of groups into consideration but also their size.
The third time-variant factor conjectured to have an impact on constitutional change is the level of democracy actually implemented in a country. There has been intense debate on how best to measure democracy, it being a prime example of an "essentially contested concept" (Gallie 1956 ). Alvarez et al. (1996) make the point that continuous measures make little sense in this regard; in other words, a country is either democratic or it is not. We are not convinced. Given the contestability and multidimensionality of concepts of democracy, continuous measures seem preferable, even if they are imperfect. Among the indicators based on the notion that there are gradations of democracy, the one by Marshall and Jaggers (2002)-the Polity IV measure-is the most widely used. Although this measure has been severely criticized on various grounds (see, e.g., the critique by Treier and Jackman (2008)), we employ it because it is available for a very long time period. However, Marshall and Jaggers (2002) also present a variable that indicates the degree to which there are binding rules that regulate participation in the political process. Binding rules exist not only in Western-type democracies, but also in one-party states; they merely regulate participation in different ways, namely: (1) "unregulated," (2) "multiple identities" (there are a few stable and enduring groups but few common interests), (3) "sectarian" (indicating intense factionalism and government favoritism), (4) "restricted" (significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process), and (5) Two important aspects of democratic societies are the degree of political competition and how many citizens actually participate in elections through voting. We take these into account by drawing on the measure "democratic competition and participation," which is the product of these two components (Vanhanen 1997) . Competition is operationalized by the percentage of votes that are not cast for the largest party, whereas participation is measured by the percentage of the population that actually voted in the last election.
In the theoretical section of this paper, we argued that political unrest could be indicative of an increasing likelihood of constitutional change. Banks (2004) presents eight empirical indicators of political unrest: (1) number of assassinations, (2) number of general strikes, (3) guerrilla warfare, (4) government crises ("any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime-excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow"), (5) purges, (6) riots, (7) revolutions, and (8) anti-government demonstrations. Related to these is an indicator specifically focusing on internal armed conflict provided by Gleditsch et al. (2002) . On a four-point scale, it describes the degree of internal armed conflict from 0 (no internal conflict) to 4 (internal war).
One factor that can ignite social unrest is poor economic performance. Economic performance is represented by (1) the level of real gross domestic product per capita and its growth rate; (2) high inflation, which signals a failure of macroeconomic policy; and (3) the government share of GDP, which is sometimes used as an indicator for the development level of a country. Very low shares would indicate an insufficient provision of basic public goods (e.g., Robinson and Torvik 2008 ).
An unfavorable development in any of these indicators is thus expected to increase the likelihood of observing a demand for constitutional change. Trade openness serves to measure a country's integration into the world economy. A high degree of integration is typically a sign of a mature economy and indicative of a free flow of ideas as well. To a certain extent, trade openness also restrains economic policy and thereby the consequences of a particular choice of form of government. We would therefore expect that openness will be associated with constitutionally more stable re-
gimes. 11
Finally, we take into account the possibility of "constitutional contagion." Similar to contagion processes in medicine, it is possible that countries might modify their constitution after observing constitutional changes in neighboring countries. Here we concentrate on geographic proximity. To ensure that we are measuring some sort of imitation behavior rather than a reflection of fundamental causes, such as the fall of the Iron Curtain, related to specific periods, we also include time dummies.
We cannot exclude the possibility that changes in the form of government are driven by factors de- damentally different from "natural state societies," where access to political office is highly restricted, it seems plausible that constitutional change will occur through different mechanisms in these two kinds of societies. For lack of a better proxy, we use OECD membership to distinguish between the two kinds of regimes. countries in this region are not counted as constitutional changes in our data set. 12 In Africa in the 1960s, many countries adopted presidential forms of government but in the early 1990s at least some of these changes have been reversed. In Southeast Asia and South Asia, the distribution over time is fairly even for changes from presidential to parliamentary and vice versa.
When Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?
In this section, we analyze the expected length of time before a switch in form of government is observed, as well as some factors influencing its survival time. Figure 3 Since many of these countries were newly created, we would be analyzing their first constitutional choices rather than constitutional change. 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 In Sections 2 and 3, we discussed a number of factors that may influence the probability of a switch from one form of government to the other. We now analyze some of these factors in the framework of a censored multiple-record-per-subject proportional hazard model. Our choice of covariates in the Cox hazard model was guided by our desire to preserve as many countries in the sample as possible and to avoid any endogeneity with the dependent variable. Note that an upper bound on the number of included variables comes from the inclusion of a great number of dummy variables, which cause problems in the maximization of the likelihood function. Table 2 provides estimates of hazard ratios for a general model (1), including all available covariates and for a reduced model (2), which is the outcome of a consistent testing-down process that ensures a high degree of estimation efficiency. The estimated models reflect the experiences of 169 countries from 1950 to 2003 and are highly significant. Most of the variables that remain after the testing-down procedure are related to geography. The relative risk of constitutional change is higher in the case of North Africa, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia than in other regions. The hazard ratios range from 6 to 13 but are statistically indistinguishable. 13 Figure 4 graphically illustrates the strong increase in hazard in the case of North Africa and the Middle East. Thus, constitutions in these regions are changed earlier than in other parts of the world. Persson and Tabellini (2003, 102) report that geographic variables are important determinants of the choice of regime type. We find that geographic variables are also those that tend to explain changes thereof.
We earlier mentioned that the constitutions implemented in newly independent countries may not be adequate for their specific needs, as they may reflect the interest of the respective colonial powers. Former French and British colonies amend their constitutions less often than do countries without a colonial history, which does not conform to the hypothesis. Note, however, that this finding does not imply that these constitutions are "optimal" in a welfare sense.
Countries with initially presidential systems also change their constitutions less often as countries with initially parliamentarian systems. 14 Figure 5 illustrates the impact of having a presidential system as the initial form of government on the survival probabilities. The graph would be almost identical in the case of either former British or former French colony.
Figure 5: Survival rates for initially presidential and initially parliamentarian forms of government 13 The joint restriction that the coefficients, and thereby the hazard ratios, of North Africa & the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia are equal cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance (chi 2 (4) = 6.3). 14 The joint restriction that the coefficients of former British colony, former French colony, and initially presidential are equal cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance (chi 2 (2) = 0.18). Presidential systems have a higher chance of survival than parliamentary forms of government for
the predicted values of model (2). This finding, that presidential systems are less likely to experience a switch than are parliamentary systems, is an interesting one: political scientists have long been trying to discover why presidential systems are more likely than parliamentarian systems to relapse into autocratic systems. Our analysis shows that, in another sense, presidential systems are more, rather than less, stable when it comes to the permanence of the form of government itself.
Including more variables that allow for an economic interpretation, rather than just analyzing dummies referring primarily to historical circumstances and geography, could be of interest. As argued above, controlling for polarization in addition to fractionalization (see Esteban and Rey 1994) , the "resource curse" (Gallup at al. 1999) , the age of statehood (Bockstette et al. 2002) , and OECD membership as an indicator of "open access societies" might yield additional insights. 15 However, in the present context, doing so should be viewed more as an auxiliary analysis: Not only is it questionable whether some of these indicators are exogenous but we lose half the observations in our sample and the number of countries drops from 169 to 87. Therefore, any change in results is more likely to be due to these variations in the sample than to the inclusion of additional variables. Table   3 contains the reduced model after the testing-down process. 16
15
We consider 24 OECD member countries that joined before 1974. 16
Omitted information is available upon request. Table 3 reveals several new relationships. First, initially presidential has a positive coefficient now, i.e., a hazard ratio above unity, but the effect is insignificant. 17 Second, there is evidence of an op-17 Note that two variables, initially presidential and religious fractionalization, are not significant according to the individual coefficient tests. However, these variables cannot be removed in a consistent testing-down process.
timal adjustment as the outcome of change in form of government, as those countries that had reformed their constitution once are less likely to alter it again soon. This effect is quite strong, as the survival rate is almost 40% if the constitution was changed before, whereas it goes down close to zero if it remains unchanged until the 1990s. Third, having a French legal origin increases the relative risk of constitutional change. However, in this smaller sample this is basically a dummy for Afghanistan. Fourth, societies characterized by a high degree of ethnic and religious fractionalization are more likely to change their form of government. At the same time, however, societies with a high degree of ethnic polarization are relatively less likely to undertake constitutional reform.
This implies that countries characterized by a large number of ethnic groups show a higher relative risk of switching their form of government than countries with two similar groups. Fifth, countries with a high share of Muslims tend to amend their constitutions relatively often. Sixth, we find that the former colonial powers are less likely to change their constitutions, implying that the constitutions of colonial powers are still adequate in a post-colonial world. Seventh, we discover evidence that countries characterized by a high share of primary exports in GNP have a lower relative risk to undertake a change in form of government; governments might be able to buy off demands for constitutional change with the proceeds from primary exports, which can be interpreted as evidence of the "resource curse."
A comparison of the survival rate of constitutions between models 2 and 3, i.e., between estimates based on the large and small samples, is shown in Figure 6 . The next question almost suggests itself: What are the factors that cause changes in the form of government? Our answers to this question are given in Section 6.
Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?
We study the question of why constitutions change in the framework of fixed-effects panel data logit models using a change in the form of government as the dependent variable. The unbalanced sample comprises 153 countries and the estimation period is 1950-2003. To reduce endogeneity problems, all variables except the time trend are lagged by one year. 18 We employ a fixed-effects estimator, which is consistent under rather general conditions, as there are doubts that the countryspecific effects are orthogonal to the other covariates of the model. 19 Table 4 shows that even though most of the individual variables in the fixed-effects panel model are insignificant, the joint test of the regressors indicates that the model has significant explanatory power. Applying a zero restriction on 28 variables that cannot be rejected results in the reduced model. The remaining 10 variables are highly significant as a group and individually significant at least at the 5% level. 20 We base our interpretation on the results obtained from the reduced model. Notes: All variables, except time trends and regional contagion indicators, enter the model lagged by one year. Estimation by random-effects panel data logit models. * (**) indicate significance at a 5% (1%) level. To avoid multicollinearity, regional contagion indicators for Western Europe & North America and for the Caribbean were omitted.
Since estimated coefficients from logit models are difficult to interpret, we rely on estimated elasticities or marginal effects computed at the means of the respective variables reported in Table 5 . 21 We find that democratization has a significantly positive impact on the likelihood of a change in the form of government. A 1% increase in the degree of democratization raises the likelihood of a switch in the form of government in the following year by 2 percentage points. Thus, political processes influencing the de facto degree of democratization will affect de jure institutions too.
21
The elasticities were derived under the assumption that the fixed effect is zero.
When societies are characterized by a substantial amount of political competition and participation, it becomes less likely that there will be constitutional change. A 1% increase in this factor lowers the likelihood of a change in the form of government by about 2 percentage points. The degree of party competition when supported by a significant number of active voters can be interpreted as an integral part of a working democracy. Thus, when the political system exhibits these characteristics, it becomes more difficult to create a majority large enough to effect constitutional changes. Looking at the joint effect of the significant democracy-related variables suggests that if a higher degree of democratization is achieved by increasing democratic competition and participation, there will be no net change on the likelihood of a change in the form of government. A move from a restricted system of political participation, the most common form in our sample, where some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism, but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process, to a sectarian system increases the probability of a change in the form of government by about 20 percentage points. In a sectarian system, political demands are dominated by incompatible interests and multiple identity groups and fluctuate between factionalism and active favoritism by whichever group controls the government. Our estimates suggest that these political systems are not perceived as optimal by the societies they govern and foster the likelihood of a constitutional change.
When a government is shaken by (nonviolent) crises, the probability that there will be a change in the form of government in the following year rises strongly. A 1% hike in the number of crises increases the likelihood of a modification in the form of government in the next period by 10 percentage points. Intermediate internal armed conflicts raise the probability of changes in the form of government 27 percentage points. Thus, the combination of government crises and serious armed conflict among different interest groups in a country foreshadow constitutional reforms.
An increase in the distribution of knowledge in a country lowers the likelihood of reform in the system of government by about 2 percentage points. Hence, a decrease in the share of students and literates in the population makes constitutional reform more likely. 
Conclusions and Outlook
Using data for as many as 169 countries, we analyze two main research questions: (1) When is a constitutional switch from one form of government to another likely to occur, and-given that a switch has indeed been observed-(2) Why did it occur? The first question is answered by analyz- the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, or South Asia. In a much smaller sample, we find evidence that other factors may also play a role in when a constitution will be changed. If the form of government has already been altered at least once, there is a lower relative risk that it will be changed again. Former colonial powers are also less likely to change their constitutions soon. In ethnically and religiously fractionalized societies, as well as those with a high proportion of Muslims, reforms in the system of government become more likely;
in ethnically polarized societies, the likelihood decreases. We find some evidence of the "resource curse": countries that rely to a large degree on primary sector exports change their institutions (here, the form of government) less frequently.
Our investigation into why countries' change their constitutions reveals that political factors are much more important than economic factors, which do not play any significant role. Moreover, domestic rather than international influences appear to be the dominant ones. Still, there are worldwide trends; for example, the fall of the Iron Curtain led to many changes in a specific time period.
Constitutional reform becomes more likely under systems of sectarian political participation, where incompatible interests lead to intense factionalism and government favoritism by the group in power. Moreover, government crises and limited armed internal conflict in the preceding year will also increase the likelihood of constitutional change. There are equal-sized effects related to the implementation of democracy in a country: those societies characterized by a higher degree of democratization will be more likely to implement changes, whereas the probability of change will be lower if there is strong democratic competition and participation. Decreases in the distribution of knowledge in a country make it more likely that the society will reform its system of government.
In Persson and Tabellini (2003) , the presidential form of government is found to be correlated with a number of desirable fiscal policy traits as well as desirable governance outcomes; however, it is not correlated with better total factor productivity. Persson (2005) finds that parliamentary systems are more likely to choose structural policy reforms that eventually lead to higher growth and income. It is thus unclear from these studies which form of government is "better" and our results are no help in this matter: apparently, government does not come in a "one size fits all." The most adequate form of government for any particular country might depend on a number of fairly exogenous conditions. If we refuse to look beyond the simple dichotomy between presidential and parliamentary systems, this is a serious blow to those who emphasize that societies have a genuine choice as to form of government. Our results seem to indicate that the choice might be fairly limited. Alternatively, our findings could be interpreted as a reflection of the fact that we do not yet understand completely the factors relevant to choice of a specific form of government.
In Section 2, we briefly summarized two competing conceptions of the presidential form of government. One stresses the higher degree of separation of powers and deduces a number of positive effects therefrom. The other stresses the majoritarian character of presidential systems and conjectures that a number of negative consequences are likely to ensue. Which of these views is "true" is something we cannot definitively answer-most likely, both are correct to some degree. It is our opinion that this debate cannot be settled unless scholars are willing to go beyond looking merely at the simple dichotomy between presidential and parliamentary systems. We suggest that future studies consider finer-grained institutional detail, such as how the president is elected (directly or indirectly), whether he or she is subject to term limits, length of term of office (assuming that long terms are conducive to more authoritarian and less accountable governments), whether there is a vice-president and how that person is elected, how broad the competencies of the president are (e.g., commander-in-chief of the army), and so forth. 23 We also believe it would be fruitful to analyze the effects of changing the form of government more closely. It could be error, for example, to assume that the "original" choice was not an equilibrium and that the switch created one. Our results from the smaller sample suggest that are very few "serial switchers" and that the probability of changing the form of government again after doing it once is quite low. But if the form of government has important effects on economic variables such as fiscal policy or total factor productivity, then it is reasonable to wonder whether a change in the form of government will actually induce changes in these policy or outcome variables. Moreover, many political scientists assume that the form of government is irrelevant once a country has relapsed into autocracy, but is this true? Finding out would be an interesting task: Does the form of government still cause effects even if a country is not democratic?
Our paper takes the first step toward empirically endogenizing specific constitutional institutions, namely, the form of government. The next and very obvious step would be to endogenize other institutions that have also been found to display significant economic effects, such as electoral rules, federalism, and direct democracy. After having identified some determinants of these institutions, the next step might be to analyze their co-evolution, i.e., the interdependence of institutional change. It would be fascinating to analyze the interaction between the change of formal constitutional rules, on the one hand, and the change in informal rules, on the other. 23 Shugart and Carey (1992, Ch. 8) propose two dimensions to ascertain the powers of presidents: (1) their power over legislation and (2) their nonlegislative powers. Regarding (1), they propose considering presidential power to veto and partial veto, the competence to pass legislation via decrees, the exclusive competence to initiate legislative proposals, the power to initiate budget proposals, and the competence to propose referendums. Regarding (2), they mention cabinet formation, dismissal of cabinet members, the "lack of assembly censure," and the power to dissolve parliament. 
